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Trading Wind Generation From Short-Term
Probabilistic Forecasts of Wind Power
Pierre Pinson, Christophe Chevallier, and George N. Kariniotakis, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Due to the fluctuating nature of the wind resource,
a wind power producer participating in a liberalized electricity
market is subject to penalties related to regulation costs. Accu-
rate forecasts of wind generation are therefore paramount for re-
ducing such penalties and thus maximizing revenue. Despite the
fact that increasing accuracy in spot forecasts may reduce penal-
ties, this paper shows that, if such forecasts are accompanied with
information on their uncertainty, i.e., in the form of predictive dis-
tributions, then this can be the basis for defining advanced strate-
gies for market participation. Such strategies permit to further
increase revenues and thus enhance competitiveness of wind gen-
eration compared to other forms of dispatchable generation. This
paper formulates a general methodology for deriving optimal bid-
ding strategies based on probabilistic forecasts of wind generation,
as well as on modeling of the sensitivity a wind power producer
may have to regulation costs. The benefits resulting from the ap-
plication of these strategies are clearly demonstrated on the test
case of the participation of a multi-MW wind farm in the Dutch
electricity market over a year.
Index Terms—Decision-making, energy markets, forecasting,
uncertainty, wind energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
WITH the liberalization of electricity markets, wind en-ergy producers have the possibility to dispatch their pro-
duction through electricity pools, rather than having recourse to
bilateral contracts. The main characteristic of these markets is
that one has to propose bids in advance, and is then charged for
any imbalance, defined hereafter as the deviation between the
actual production and the energy bid. Owing to the problem of
predictability, the market value of wind energy is reduced by the
cost for regulation [1].
The participation of wind energy producers in electricity
pools is a decision-making problem: the characteristics of
regulation prices may encourage them to be more strategic in
their way of bidding on the day-ahead market in order to re-
strain these regulation costs [2]. The definition of participation
strategies calls for forecasts of future wind generation, typically
for the next 24–72 h, which may be produced from either
reference or advanced methods. While forecast accuracy is the
main focus of forecasters, forecasts’ users are concerned with
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the maximization of the benefits (economical or not) resulting
from the use of predictions. This is what is commonly referred
to as the forecast value [3]. The present paper contributes to
the discussion on the value of wind power forecasts in a market
environment, by showing how associated uncertainty estimates
increase that value.
So far, several studies concerning the participation of wind
energy in electricity markets have been carried out, considering
different market mechanisms and various prediction method-
ologies. Some of them focus on the use of point predictions
and relate the accuracy of the forecasts to the resulting regu-
lation costs [4], [5]. In contrast, methods described in [6] and
[7] integrate information on prediction uncertainty for taking
advantage of the asymmetry of imbalance prices, while [8] and
[9] describe participation strategies based on optimal quantile
forecasts of wind generation. Finally, [10] proposes a complete
methodology that accounts for the uncertainty in both wind
power predictions and imbalance prices by using scenarios of
power production and imbalances prices, consequently used
in a stochastic optimization problem. Our aim in the present
paper is to compare the market value of different wind power
forecasting methods and their associated bidding strategies.
Two rival approaches are considered, i.e., point forecasting and
probabilistic forecasting methods. It is shown how the latter
ones outperform the former ones when used in conjunction
with appropriate bidding strategies. Such optimal bidding
strategies are described. They use the utility theory in order
to build a model of the sensitivity of the market participant to
regulation costs. Both probabilistic forecasts and this model are
consequently integrated in a suitable decision-making process
in a stochastic optimization framework.
Initially, the main characteristics of electricity markets are re-
viewed. It is explained how wind energy may be penalized in
comparison to dispatchable generation. Then, the assumptions
for the present study are given and the problem is formulated
in a general manner, so that the application of the proposed bid-
ding strategies can be extended to other cases. The methodology
for the definition of optimal bidding strategies follows. Finally,
the participation of a real multi-MW wind farm in the Dutch
electricity pool is simulated over a year, illustrating the benefits
of the introduced methodology for deriving optimal bids from
probabilistic predictions of wind generation in comparison to
bids based on point forecasts only.
II. TRADING WIND GENERATION IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
A. Description of Electricity Markets
At any time, the total amount of produced electricity must
meet consumption. Electricity markets may be considered as an
0885-8950/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE
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alternative solution to power units scheduling, since they guar-
antee a cost-effective match between supply and demand bids.
Each electricity pool has its own rules, defining the way elec-
tricity is to be sold or purchased, how the prices are settled,
and the obligations to which the participants are committed. In
order to stimulate the development of renewables, some pools
have special rules supporting wind generation, such as guaran-
teed prices or no program-responsibility. An overview of Eu-
ropean electricity pools is given in [11] while the regulatory
frameworks for the integration of wind energy in some of the
European countries are described in [12].
Electricity exchanges first take place in the day-ahead (spot)
market, where participants (sellers and buyers) have to propose
before gate closure their quantity-price bids over the following
delivery period, for every unit of time hereafter referred to as
program time unit (PTU). The bids are all matched through a
single auction process for determining the market clearing price
(also referred to as spot price) and the program of the partici-
pants for each PTU. Participants are then financially responsible
for any deviation from contract. Because of the significant delay
between gate closure and the beginning of the energy delivery
period (up to 12–14 h), certain electricity pools also integrate
intraday markets, where it is possible to take corrective actions.
Gate closure on intraday markets occurs between 30 min and
2 h before time of delivery.
The regulation market, which is managed by the transmission
system operator (TSO), ensures the real-time balance between
generation and load. Even if the settlement mechanism for im-
balance prices varies from one country to the other, the general
principles remain the same: 1) in the case for which produc-
tion perfectly matches consumption, no regulation is needed;
2) if the production is not sufficient to meet the load, this leads
to an up-regulation situation, for which it is necessary to in-
crease generation (or alternatively to decrease consumption);
and 3) if production exceeds consumption, one faces a down-
regulation situation, where generation has to be reduced (or con-
sumption to be increased). If the grid has good interconnec-
tions with neighboring systems, a part of the excess energy may
be exported, but more often, generation curtailment is envis-
aged for lowering generation. The connections between various
areas of the overall power system may also step in the regula-
tion problem: due to a limitation of these connections, it may
be necessary to dispatch both positive power in a certain area
and negative power in another area. Consequently, imbalance
prices are generally highly variable and hardly predictable. They
should reflect the production (or curtailment) costs, include a
premium for readiness, and discourage power producers to plan
imbalances.
B. Assumptions
In order to simulate the participation of a wind energy pro-
ducer in electricity pools or for developing advanced bidding
strategies, some assumptions about the impact of wind genera-
tion on the behavior of the markets must be formulated. In ad-
dition, a thorough description of the framework in which the
present study is carried out will allow us to establish to what ex-
tent the results obtained can be generalized.
It is expected that if large amounts of wind power are intro-
duced in a power system, this would tend to lower the average
spot price on the related electricity pool in the long-term [3].
Model simulations on the Nord Pool, which is a market highly
penetrated by wind generation, have shown that wind power
should affect the spot market also in the short-run, more pre-
cisely by producing a downward pressure on market prices [14].
However, when analyzing the Nord Pool market data over 2002
and 2003, [13] found that this trend was not statistically signif-
icant. Here, potential effects related to wind penetration in the
market are neglected. Wind power producers are considered as
price-takers, i.e., as economic entities that are too small to affect
alone the market clearing price.
Owing to its nondispatchable and not easily predictable na-
ture, the participation of wind generation in electricity pools
compulsorily yields a certain volume of imbalances that would
not occur if only conventional units were proposing bids on the
market. Though, in the same way that we have made the assump-
tion that a single wind power producer had no market power, we
also assume that the bidding policy of this power producer alone
cannot impact imbalance prices. Note that this assumption is im-
plicit in the developments carried out in [8] and [9], while it is
explicitly formulated in [6].
Moreover, it is assumed that wind power producers act in
electricity markets as conventional producers and do not benefit
from derogatory rules. This is consistent with foreseen future
developments of electricity markets. In addition, it is consid-
ered that they do not make any bids for regulation or reserve
power supply, or corrective actions in intraday markets. A final
assumption that will be made for the case-study of the present
paper (see Section IV) is that wind power producers do not
apply control strategies on their production. This is because
focus is given to the sole value of forecasting in a market en-
vironment. However, the proposed methodology can account
for these control aspects or internal balancing possibilities used
for optimally facing imbalances, depending on their magnitude.
This is explained in Section III-B1, where the loss function of
the wind power producer is introduced. This “no-control” as-
sumption used for the case study is thus a restrictive assumption
on the value of wind generation in electricity pools in compar-
ison to the case for which wind is incorporated into a broader re-
source portfolio. Combining wind generation with conventional
means or storage allows one to lower the amount of imbalances
on the market. For instance, combined wind-storage systems are
studied in [15], and the possibility of combining wind and hydro
power generation is considered in [16].
C. Formulation of the Problem
For any PTU , a market participant has to propose a
level of contracted energy . The -index is used for
designating a given PTU since it indeed corresponds to a lead
time when bids are proposed at time . The revenue
of a market participant proposing an amount of energy but
actually generating can be formulated as
(1)
where is the spot price for this PTU, and is the im-
balance cost on the regulation market. The imbalance is
defined as
(2)
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and consequently, is given by
(3)
with and the imbalance prices for positive and nega-
tive imbalances, respectively.
Note that these two imbalance prices depend on the consid-
ered regulation mechanism. In certain cases, they simply equal
a certain proportion of the market clearing price—for instance
in Spain, they are such that and
[5]. More generally, these imbalance prices are
asymmetric and follow a more complex function of the spot
price. For some other regulation mechanisms, e.g., on the Nord
Pool, they may even depend on the sign of the imbalance as a
whole, so that participants who offset the system imbalance are
not penalized [2], [9].
Eq. (1) can be reformulated such that the revenue of a
participant for PTU results from the combination of the
income from the selling of actual wind generation at the
spot price, minus the costs for regulation, i.e.
(4)
where
(5)
and , which are referred to as the regulation unit
costs for positive and negative imbalances, respectively, are
readily given by
(6)
(7)
The formulation given by (4) has the advantage that the first
component of the revenue is a “fatal” component and indeed
corresponds to the income one would receive if using perfect
predictions. Moreover, since the contracted energy only appears
in the second component of the participant’s revenue, maxi-
mizing now translates to minimizing the costs for regu-
lation . In the specific case for which a market participant
is not charged for his imbalance since this imbalance helps the
regulation process, .
Owing to the nature of regulation costs, which are mainly pe-
nalizing, the revenue can also be written in the form of a per-
formance ratio . It will be used for the evaluation of the rival
bidding strategies. The performance ratio is calculated over
a certain period of time by normalizing the actual revenue by
the revenue that would be obtained if one had the possibility to
use perfect forecasts. Considering an evaluation period of
participation days in the electricity pool, each participation day
covering daily PTUs, writes
(8)
The proposed performance ratio is such that , and
it will be expressed in percent. It is obvious that for perfect pre-
diction, since deviations are null.
III. DEFINITION OF ADVANCED BIDDING STRATEGIES
A. Base-Line Strategies Based on Point Predictions
Point prediction methods provide estimates of the expected
power production of a wind farm with a forecast length of up
to 2–3 days ahead and with a forecast resolution ranging from
15 min to 1 h [17]. For a given look-ahead time , they give
estimates of the average power output between lead times
and . Therefore, it appears reasonable to give a forecast
of the wind energy generated during that period as the product
of the average power production by the forecast resolution . If
denoting by and , the power and energy forecasts,
respectively, issued a time for lead time , this writes
(9)
For convenience, power forecasts are normalized by the nom-
inal power of the considered wind farm, and energy forecasts
by , so that they take values in the unit interval. If point pre-
dictions are the only information one has on future wind gener-
ation, then they comprise the best bid one can propose for
PTU as follows:
(10)
B. Optimal Bidding Strategies Based on
Probabilistic Forecasts
Instead of seeing as a true effect one wants to predict as
accurately as possible with , one may have a probabilistic
view of the problem, by considering that is a random vari-
able and that is a realization of that random variable. Point
predictions produced in a minimum square error sense
are indeed estimates of the conditional expectation of the
distribution of (conditional to the information set avail-
able at time ). Denote by the density function of .
Though, the expectation is only a summary statistics of what
can be the realization , and it cannot give an information
on what could happen. Note that from now on, the imbalance
is also seen as a random variable, defined as
(11)
such that denotes a realization of that random variable.
Hereafter, it is supposed that a forecast of the density
function of is available at time , given, e.g., by the expert
model described in [18] and [19, Ch. 4]. Probabilistic forecasts
are the basis of the methodology proposed below for designing
optimal bidding strategies, accompanied by the modeling of the
sensitivity of the market participant to regulation costs, which
are then both integrated in a suitable decision-making process.
1) Modeling the Market Participant’s Utility Function: The
utility assigns a degree of happiness in the form of a single
numerical value to every possible outcome with which a de-
cision-maker may be faced. Following the formulation of the
participant’s revenue given by (4), maximizing the participant’s
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utility function directly translates to minimizing the loss func-
tion associated to regulations costs. Modeling the perceived loss
for the wind power producer as a function of the amount of reg-
ulation may not be an easy task [9], [20]. Ideally, this model re-
sults from a discussion between an analyst and the wind power
producer.
In a first stage, let us define the basic properties of a function
, which gives the loss associated to a given imbalance as
follows:
(12)
The imbalance is contained in the range [ 1,1] since we
work with normalized variables. Values of are always
greater than or equal to 0, following the assumption that a
market participant does not expect to be rewarded for an im-
balance. It may be possible to build a loss function depending
on or , in order to account for diurnal or seasonal trends
in regulation unit costs. The loss functions used in the case
study of the paper are independent of , and we will study the
benefits of introducing a different loss function depending on
the season of the year.
The function is defined as a continuous piecewise linear
function, in order to reflect different level of losses for different
ranges of imbalances. It is assumed that the loss is strictly in-
creasing when the deviation from the level of contracted energy
increases. This translates to being an increasing function such
that for and for . Note
that may not be defined for certain values of , since is
piecewise. This set of properties leads to being a convex func-
tion. Finally, must be such that , since the market
participant does not have to buy or sell energy on the regulation
market if there is no deviation from contract. This is also in line
with the idea that the use of perfect predictions would lead to
the maximum income.
A straightforward way of defining is to consider that the
loss is directly given by the regulation unit costs and .
They then define the slope of linear functions for positive and
negative values of as follows:
(13)
The regulation unit costs and are not known when
bidding at time . Consequently, they have to be replaced by
forecasts or estimates in (13). These forecasts can be obtained by
models using as input the market clearing price [2], [21] (which
is settled a few hours after gate closure). In such a case, regula-
tion prices cannot be forecast prior to defining an optimal bid,
unless using in a first stage a model for forecasting spot prices
[22]. Alternatively, an estimation strategy consisting of clima-
tology-like forecasts can already be valuable [23]. In the present
paper, we will only assume that it is possible to predict a trend
(on an annual or a quarterly basis) for the regulation unit costs.
Fig. 1 gives the example of two alternative loss functions. The
first one, referred to as “market-based,” represents the type of
loss functions used in the present paper, for which the slope of
the two linear parts is directly given by the regulation unit costs
for positive and negative imbalances. Alternatively, one could
use more “advanced” curves to represent the loss function, such
as the piecewise linear function shown in Fig. 1. Such functions
Fig. 1. Example of two different loss functions based either on the regulation
unit costs only or on expertise reflecting the sensitivity of the wind power pro-
ducer to the magnitude of deviations from contract.
may be more appropriate in situations for which the sensitivity
of the end-user varies with the magnitude of the deviation from
contract and integrate internal balancing possibilities. They can
be designed in a heuristic way. The “advanced” loss function
in Fig. 1 corresponds to an example where the end-user has the
possibility to combine wind energy with some storage and con-
ventional generation when trading, as envisaged in, e.g., [15]
and [16]. It then permits to account for the possibility to use
this storage for compensating small positive and negative im-
balances (here in the range [ 0.15,0.18]). The related slopes
and ranges in the loss function depend on the charging and dis-
charging efficiencies of the storage, as well as the chosen con-
trol strategy. Then, for larger negative imbalances (in the range
[ 0.6, 0.15]), the wind power producer has the possibility of
coupling his output with conventional generation up to a cer-
tain level. The cost of this coupling defines the slope for this
range of imbalances. Finally, for imbalances outside of the range
[ 0.6,0.18], he does not have any more option for facing imbal-
ances, and his loss is directly defined by the unit imbalance costs
on the electricity pool.
2) Bidding Strategies Tailored to End-User Needs: Given
the probabilistic distribution of wind generation for PTU
, and given the loss function , a contract level can be
determined in various ways. Indeed, the definition of an op-
timal bidding strategy, like the modeling of the loss function,
depends on the sensitivity of the market participant to penal-
ties. The market participant may want to optimize his utility
on the electricity pool over a certain period of time, or alter-
natively to minimize the risk of large losses since the related
costs might be prohibitive. These two alternative strategies are
referred to as probabilistic choice (PC) and risk adverse (RA),
following the terminology introduced in [24], where these de-
cision-making paradigms have been successfully applied for
power system planning. Note that the latter type of bidding
strategies is at the expense of a maximum utility on the long-
term though.
Maximizing the utility of the market participant over a certain
period of time is equivalent to minimizing the expectation of the
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loss function for each of these PTUs. The loss expectation for
PTU writes
(14)
and the optimization problem to be solved for every PTU is as
follows:
(15)
In the case where the loss function is a direct model of the
regulation unit costs [cf. (13)], the optimal bid at PTU ,
which thus minimizes the expectation of , is indeed given
by
(16)
where is the cumulative distribution function for the
random variable (for a proof, see [8] and [9]). In prac-
tice, an estimate of can be derived from a predictive
distribution . Also, following the assumption that wind
generation and regulation costs are independent random vari-
ables, and can be replaced by estimates of their
expectation [6], [9], for instance, given by average values over
a past period. If considering more advanced loss functions,
numerical optimization methods have to be envisaged for
determining the optimal bid . For the class of loss functions
described in Section III-B1 (or more generally, for the class
of strictly convex loss functions such that ), the
optimization problem (15) admits a unique minimum over the
range of possible contract levels. Local optimization methods
are thus sufficient for determining optimal bids. A proof of this
statement is given in the Appendix.
Eq. (16) tells that the optimal bid one can make on
an electricity pool for maximizing the participant’s income is
not given by a point forecast (which is an estimate of the wind
generation expectation) but instead by a particular quantile of
predictive distributions of wind generation. The proportion of
this quantile is a direct function of the regulation prices. There-
fore, when defining market bids from point forecasts only, it is
not necessarily the most accurate point forecasting method (in
a minimum square error sense) that would lead to the higher
revenue on the market. This is because the criterion used for es-
timating the accuracy (or quality) of point predictions is not the
same as the one considered for assessing their value in an oper-
ational context.
Alternatively, in meteorological situations exhibiting low pre-
dictability, a wind power producer might prefer to minimize the
risk of large losses and thus use an RA strategy. Then, the op-
timization problem consists in finding the bid that mini-
mizes the worst possible scenario. Such a minimax problem can
be formulated as
(17)
where probabilistic distributions are to be replaced by pre-
dictive distributions . The optimization problem (17) can
be solved with appropriate numerical methods.
Note that when applying a risk adverse policy, the loss func-
tion must reflect the participant aversion for losses, which is
obviously not optimally represented by linear functions with
slopes given by averages of regulation unit costs. In fact, it
would be preferable to consider upper bounds on the value of
expected imbalance costs, or alternatively to use quadratic loss
functions. This is discussed in [6].
IV. EVALUATION OF BIDDING STRATEGIES
ON AN ELECTRICITY POOL
A. Case Study
1) Electricity Pool: The participation of a wind power pro-
ducer in the Dutch electricity pool is simulated over 2002. This
pool includes the day-ahead market APX, to which is associated
the regulation market run by TenneT, the TSO for the Nether-
lands. The gate closure on APX is at 10:30 for the following day,
with a PTU length of 1 h. Market participant are paid by APX the
spot price for the contracted energy, independently of their ac-
tual production. The entrance and annual fees for participating
in APX are not included in the study. APX spot and TenneT
regulation markets are independent, and there is no constraint
on the sign or the magnitude of imbalance prices. In some situ-
ations, regulation unit costs and can be negative: elec-
tricity then becomes a waste good [23]. This appears surprising
but is indeed easily explainable by the so-called must-run char-
acter of some non-flexible generators [25]. Negative prices are
therefore acceptable to these power suppliers since the costs of
a shutdown period are sometimes much higher.
Table I gathers the average spot and regulation prices for
the whole year of 2002 but also on a monthly and quarterly
basis. Regulation prices related to positive imbalances tend to
be higher than those related to negative ones: the ratio between
their yearly averages equals 2.7. However, this ratio is highly
variable from a quarter to the other and even more from a month
to the other. During the first four months, average regulation unit
costs for downward regulation are even larger than the average
spot prices on the day-ahead market—the market is then more
penalizing with respect to deviations from contract. In parallel,
the unit costs for upward regulation are very low, even negative
on average for three out of these four months. The inverse situa-
tion, i.e., high prices for negative imbalances, and low prices for
positive ones, occurred two months during that year, in August
and December. Over 2002, regulation unit costs were indeed
negative 47.42% and 19.81% of the times for the case of neg-
ative and positive deviations from contract, respectively. Such
behavior of the market could conduce participants to intend im-
balances. It is argued in [26] that gaming strategies on the Dutch
electricity market cannot be profitable, since it would be neces-
sary to predict at least the sign of the overall system imbalance
to apply these strategies, which is hardly feasible.
2) Wind Power Producer: The participation of the operator
of a 15-MW wind farm in Ireland is considered. Wind power
data consist in power measurements and in a series of 48-h ahead
point predictions for the year 2002, as obtained from the applica-
tion of the fuzzy-neural networks (Fuzzy-NN)-based approach
introduced in [27]. This is an advanced forecasting method, the
performance of which is at the typical level of performance that
can be found in the state-of-the-art [17], [28]. The evaluation
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TABLE I
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS FOR 2002: AVERAGE SPOT AND REGULATION PRICES (IN euros/MWh) ON A MONTHLY (M)
AND QUARTERLY (Q) BASIS, AS WELL AS THE AVERAGES OVER THE YEAR (Y)
Fig. 2. Example of a 48-h ahead probabilistic forecast of normalized (by P ) wind power production for a multi-MW wind farm in Ireland. Point predictions
are dressed with prediction intervals whose nominal coverage range from 10% to 90%, with 10% increments. A non-parametric and continuous estimate of the
probabilistic distribution of wind power production for a given lead time can be readily obtained by linear interpolation through the predicted quantiles for that
lead time.
methodology proposed here consists in comparing the benefits
from the use of an advanced method with those that would be ob-
tained by the use of Persistence and perfect forecasts. The Per-
sistence prediction method consists in using the last measured
power value (here at 10:00) as a prediction for all look-ahead
times. The use of Persistence and perfect forecasts can be seen
as the most pessimistic and optimistic cases for trading wind
power. The revenues from these two methods will define an en-
velope in which the revenues from the use of advanced methods
are expected to lie.
The PTU length on APX is of 1 h, while it shortens to 15 min
on the regulation market run by TenneT. Because we do not
want to dilute the variations of imbalance prices, we use the
TenneT PTU as the time unit for this simulation. This translates
to assuming that the quantities of energy proposed on the spot
market can be divided in four equal amounts of energy, for the
four TenneT PTUs included in an APX PTU, sold at the same
hourly spot price. A similar assumption is made for measured
quantities, for comparison between contracted and actual levels
of energy.
Predictive distributions are obtained by applying the adapted
resampling method [18], [19, Ch. 4] to the Fuzzy-NN point fore-
casts. The size of error samples is set to 300 items, the number
of bootstrap replications to 50, and finally five triangular fuzzy
sets are used for modeling the different uncertainty regimes as
a function of the level of predicted power. Interval forecasts
are produced for several nominal coverage rates, from 10% to
90%, with 10% increments, which is equivalent to estimating 18
quantiles of the predictive distributions of wind power for each
look-ahead time. Fig. 2 depicts an example of such probabilistic
forecasts in the form of a fan chart.
The wind power producer participates in the market with
the aim of maximizing his revenue over 2002. As explained
in Section II-B, it is assumed that the wind power producer
does not apply control strategies or have internal balancing
possibilities for optimally facing imbalances depending on
their magnitude. Therefore, the modeling of his sensitivity
to regulation costs is based on the penalties for upward and
downward dispatch only (cf. “market-based” curve in Fig. 1). It
is assumed that it is possible to estimate (or forecast) the annual
or quarterly trends for regulation unit costs. Therefore, two PC
strategies and are defined, based either on a single
loss function for the whole year or on four different loss
functions for the four quarters of 2002 . In (13), estimates
of regulation unit costs for upward and downward dispatch are
replaced by the annual and quarterly averages given in Table I.
Hence, following results rely on the assumption that one can
perfectly predict trends for regulation unit costs. For every day
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TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULTS OVER 2002: STRATEGIES BASED ON POINT PREDICTIONS ONLY, OBTAINED FROM PERSISTENCE, THE FUZZY-NN PREDICTION
METHOD, AND TWO PC STRATEGIES ( : ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE REGULATION PENALTIES— : QUARTERLY ESTIMATES).
THESE STRATEGIES ARE COMPARED TO THE CASE FOR WHICH PERFECT PREDICTIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE
of the year, and for each PTU, bids are defined by solving the
optimization problem (15).
B. Results and Discussion
Table II summarizes the results from the application of the
various strategies, including those based on Persistence and
Fuzzy-NN forecasts, as well as and .
C. Strategies Based on Point Predictions
The prediction biases for the Persistence and the Fuzzy-NN-
based methods equal 4.4% and 1.98% (of produced energy):
both methods tend to slightly under-predict wind generation.
The amount of energy in surplus is indeed higher than that in
shortage. Therefore, the wind farm operator is more exposed
to penalties for positive imbalances. This, combined with the
fact that unit costs for such positive deviations from contract
are larger than those for negative deviations, makes that the reg-
ulation costs associated to the energy in surplus are much higher
than those related to shortage. However, the overall regulation
costs are substantially reduced thanks to the use of an advanced
approach instead of Persistence. The performance ratio [cf.
(8)] equals 79.1% if using Persistence forecasts and 86.99% if
using Fuzzy-NN forecasts. In other words, regulation costs are
diminished by 37.75%, when preferring the advanced predic-
tion method.
In a general manner, it is owing to their higher accuracy that
advanced forecasting approaches have a greater value than ref-
erence methods. Their improvement with respect to Persistence
(which corresponds to a relative error reduction) reaches high
levels (up to 40%–60%) for horizons further than 6–10 h ahead
[29]. Therefore, this directly translates to decreasing the amount
of energy subject to regulation, even if the revenue on the day-
ahead market is rather similar. Here, the quantity of energy
subject to regulation drops from 73.6% to 40.55% (of the pro-
duced energy) if defining bids from Fuzzy-NN forecasts instead
of Persistence predictions. Hence, preferring advanced predic-
tion methods significantly decreases the financial risks that the
market participant may have to face.
Over 2002, the average spot price is 29.99 euros/MWh (cf.
Table I). If always bidding the same amount of energy for every
PTU of the year, this would be the average price per produced
MWh one would receive from APX. However, owing to pro-
duction fluctuations, this statistical average does not correspond
to the maximum price per produced MWh a wind power pro-
ducer can expect. Here, even if using perfect predictions, that
average price per produced MWh equals 28.37 euros/MWh,
which is significantly lower than the statistical average. Higher
quantities of wind generation are sold when the market clearing
price is low and less when this price is high. When considering
Persistence or Fuzzy-NN forecasts for bidding on APX, that
average price per produced MWh lowers to 22.44 and 24.68
euros/MWh, respectively, due to regulation costs. In addition,
one notices that the average cost per MWh subject to regulation
is not the same in both cases: when using Persistence, even if the
amount of energy in imbalance is much higher over the year, the
average regulation unit cost is significantly lower (8.05 instead
of 9.13 euros/MWh).
1) Strategies Based on Probabilistic Forecasts: Even with
bidding strategies defined with annual averages of regulation
unit costs, the revenue of the market participant is higher than
if applying strategies based on point forecasts only. While the
performance ratio equals 86.99% when using Fuzzy-NN fore-
casts, this ratio reaches 89.14% with the strategy . Because
of the significant variations of regulation unit prices, defining
different loss functions depending on the period of the year al-
lows one to further increase the resulting income: the perfor-
mance ratio reaches 92.1% when applying the strategy .
This indeed means that the regulation costs over 2002 are re-
duced by 39% when considering the strategy instead of that
based on Fuzzy-NN predictions only. Consequently, the more
one can integrate information on the regulation unit costs be-
havior, by increasing the resolution of forecasts of these costs,
the more the revenue from participation in the electricity market
would increase. Though, one must remember that it is particu-
larly difficult to estimate regulation prices with a high forecast
resolution [2], [26]). In addition, the proposed strategies follow
from the assumption that wind generation has no influence on
regulation unit costs in the short-run and thus that the corre-
sponding random variables can be considered as independent.
This may not be true for markets significantly penetrated by
wind.
The revenue of the wind power producer is not increased by
reducing the amount of energy in imbalance. It is actually the
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inverse: while this amount is equal to 40.55% of the contracted
energy for the bidding strategy based on Fuzzy-NN forecasts, it
rises to 45.72% and 55.46% for the cases of strategies and
. Further integrating information on the regulation market’s
behavior would lead to an orientation of the imbalances. Since
on average the unit costs for positive imbalances are higher than
those for negative imbalances, it is preferable to propose quan-
tities of energy that are more possibly subject to shortage than
to surplus regulation. This is preferable for both the wind power
producer and the TSO, since the definition of imbalance penal-
ties also directly reflects the sensitivity of the TSO to the bal-
ance of the system. Therefore, for other electricity markets with
different behaviors, or if a given regulation market behavior
evolves, it can be accounted for by modifying the loss func-
tion .
Going from bidding strategies based on Fuzzy-NN forecasts
only to PC strategies and , the costs supported by the
wind power producer over 2002 for upward and downward reg-
ulation are completely different. With PC strategies, the costs
for up-regulation are slightly higher than those for down-reg-
ulation, even though the quantities of energy in shortage are
much higher. In addition, the cost of a regulated MWh lowers
when considering optimal bidding strategies, whatever the sign
of needed regulation. On average, this cost per MWh subject to
regulation is divided by more than two when applying the bid-
ding strategy (equal to 4.04 euros/MWh) in comparison
to that based on Fuzzy-NN forecasts. In this simulation, the av-
erage cost of regulation per produced MWh, which is defined as
the difference between the average energy price obtained by ap-
plying a given bidding strategy and by using perfect predictions,
ranges from 2.24 euros/MWh for to 5.93 euros/MWh for
the Persistence-forecast-based policy. These numbers cannot be
generalized for other years on the Dutch market or for other
electricity pools, but since all electricity markets have a similar
structure, applying optimal bidding strategies is also expected
to result in a diminution of regulation costs per produced MWh.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Wind power forecasting has an interest for wind power
producers participating in electricity pools. However, because
wind power forecasts contain an inherent part of uncertainty,
and since their level of accuracy is not expected to be dra-
matically improved in the near future, there will always be
regulation costs induced by forecasting errors. In this paper,
it has been shown that integrating an uncertainty information
in the decision-making process could considerably increase
the market value of wind power forecasts. For that purpose,
a generic methodology for designing optimal participation
strategies has been described, which takes into account the
forecast uncertainty in the form of predictive distributions and
a model of the market participant’s sensitivity to regulation
costs. This methodology is flexible in the sense that it can be
tailored to the specific needs of the market participant, ideally
following an exchange between him and an analyst.
Simulation results have been presented on the case study of
the participation of a multi-MW wind farm in the Dutch elec-
tricity pool, with revenue-maximization strategies. It has been
assumed that it would be possible to estimate trends for regu-
lation unit costs, on a annual or quarterly basis. It would be of
particular interest to further investigate on that topic in order to
see to what extent it is possible to model and forecast the regu-
lation penalties. Moreover, the possibility to apply different bid-
ding strategies depending on the expected level of uncertainty
has not been discussed. Considering prediction risk indices such
as those introduced in [19, Ch. 5] (and also risk indices related
to expected regulation costs) may be a possibility for making a
choice between the application of either PC or RA strategies.
This would result in avoiding excessive regulation costs in situ-
ations exhibiting low predictability.
The introduced methodology is suitable for the case of the
participation of a wind power producer in a day-ahead electricity
market. It can be extended in the future (in a stochastic program-
ming framework) to other decision-making processes related to
the management or trading of wind power, for the participation
in several markets with various gate closures, for the coupling
of wind with storage or conventional generation, etc. All man-
agement and trading problems involving wind generation prove
to be optimization under uncertainty problems.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix is given the proof of the uniqueness of the
solution of the optimization problem (15), provided that has
the properties described in Section III-B1. The piecewise linear
function can be expressed as
(18)
where , . Also, there exists , , such
that , with for , for , and
, . Finally, the continuity of imposes restrictions
on the coefficients.
The loss expectation for PTU is given in (14). The deriva-
tive of with respect to , denoted by ,
writes
(19)
By using the Leibniz rule for derivation under the integral
sign, (19) becomes
(20)
which yields
(21)
From the definition of , and since is positive, it is clear
that and . In addition, the above equation can
be rewritten as
(22)
Since and strictly increasing, we have
, . It can then be concluded that the solution
of exists and is unique. This conclusion can be
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extended to the class of strictly convex loss functions such that
, since could then be described by (18), with possibly
tending toward infinity.
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